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CHAPTER 8 
Conflict of Laws 
JEAN E. DE V ALPINE 
§8.1. Applicability of state or federal law: Commercial paper of 
the United States: Standards and burden of proof. In Elbar Realty, 
Inc. v. City Bank &- Trust Co'! in which Massachusetts was the forum of 
an action between private parties and in which Massachusetts law other-
wise governed the case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
that Massachusetts rules were controlling with respect to standards and 
burden of proof applicable to the trial and adjudication of issues as to 
status, quality of title, and rights inter se of such parties in relation 
to a United States Treasury Certificate of Indebtedness. 
A United States Treasury Certificate of Indebtedness was stolen 
from the plaintiff. A third person pledged this paper as collateral for 
a loan from the defendant. The defendant, resorting to this collateral, 
sent it to the First National Bank of Boston for collection, and First 
National sent it to the Federal Reserve Bank for redemption. The 
plaintiff brought an action of tort for conversion against the defendant, 
which pleaded in defense that it was a holder in due course. On denial 
of its motion for a directed verdict, the defendant went up on a bill of 
exceptions including the contention that, because the case dealt with 
a negotiable instrument issued by the United States, federal and not 
state law was applicable with respect to standards and burden of proof 
in determination of the issue as to holder in due course. 
The Court held that the case was to be determined in accordance 
with standards and burden of proof as prescribed by the law of Mas-
sachusetts. This aspect of the Elbar decision was highly predictable 
and amply supported by precedent and good sense. In litigation relat-
ing to United States commercial paper, the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins2 is not decisive. The general rule as to whether state or 
federal law will apply is derived mainly from two cases, Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States3 and Bank at America National Trust &-
Savings Assn. v. Parnell,4 This rule is that when the United States 
JEAN E. DE VALPINE is a member of the firm of Powers, Hall, Montgomery &: 
Weston, Boston. 
§8.1. 1342 Mass. 262,173 N.E.2d 256 (1961). 
2304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
3318 U.S. 363,63 Sup. Ct. 573, 87 L. Ed. 838 (1943). 
4352 U.S. 29, 77 Sup. Ct. 119, 1 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1956). 
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Government is itself a party, or when although not a party a "federal 
interest" is involved, then federal law governs; but when there is no 
such "federal interest" and the case comprises only private parties, 
state law governs. 
In the Clearfield case the United States brought suit on the Clearfield 
Bank's guaranty of prior endorsements, when that bank had cashed a 
Government check on the forged endorsement of the payee and had 
collected the amount of the check from the United States. The 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the case was to be gov-
erned by federal law and not by state law. The Court said: 
When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is 
exercising a constitutional function or power. This check was 
issued for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief 
Act of [April 8] 1935, 49 Stat. 115, c. 48. The authority to issue 
the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the 
United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Penn-
sylvania or of any other state. . . . The duties imposed upon the 
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issu-
ance find their roots in the same federal sources.1i 
The Court added another reason: "The application of state law 
even without the conflict of laws rules of the forum would subject the 
rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It 
would lead to great diversity of result." 
In National Metropolitan Bank v. United States,6 a suit by the 
United States against the presenting bank, which had cashed Govern-
ment checks on the forged endorsement of the payee on that bank's 
guaranty of prior endorsements, the United States Supreme Court held 
that federal and not state law applied to the defenses of the bank. 
These defenses were: (1) that the endorsement did not amount to a 
guaranty of the payee's signature, (2) that issuance of checks by the 
Government was a warranty that they were not fictitious and this war-
ranty was breached, and (3) that the Government's disbursing agencies 
neglected properly to supervise and examine the transactions both 
before and after the first and succeeding checks were issued, thereby 
delaying discovery of the fraud, and this neglect, not the bank's guar-
anty, caused the Government's loss. With little discussion of the con-
flicts question, the Supreme Court applied the Clearfield rule. 
In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Pamell,'f the 
United States Supreme Court applied state law to questions of stand-
ards and burden of proof of good faith. However, the question of 
"overdueness" of the bonds was determined by federal law, the Court 
saying of this point that "Federal law of course governs the interpreta-
Ii ll18 u.s. 868, 866, 68 Sup. Ct. 578, 575, 87 L. Ed. 888, 841 (1948). See also 
Miskin, The Variousness of Federal Law, 105 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 797, 824, 828 (1957); 
Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 842 (1950). 
6828 u.S. 454, 65 Sup. Ct. 8M, 89 L. Ed. 888 (1945). 
1852 u.S. 29, 77 Sup. Ct. 119, 1 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1956). 
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tion of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the bonds 
themselves." The Court did not find a sufficient federal interest in this 
suit between private persons in the possibility that "the floating of 
securities of the United States might somehow or other be adversely 
affected by the local rule of a particular state regarding the liability 
of a converter. This is far too speculative, far too remote a possibility 
to justify the application of Federal law to transactions essentially of 
local concern." 
In Gramatan National Bank &- Trust Co. v. Moody8 (cited along with 
the Parnell case by Mr. Justice Cutter in the Elbar case), the plaintiff 
bank sought to recover on a negotiable note insured under the National 
Housing Act.lI The defendants were husband and wife who had con-
tracted to have their home insulated by Keystone Home Insulation. 
Keystone, for value, endorsed the note to the plaintiff. When the de-
fendants argued that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course, the 
Supreme Judicial Court said: " ... the case apparently was tried be-
low and has been argued in this court on the assumption that the rights 
of the parties are to be governed by the law of this Commonwealth. 
We shall deal with the case accordingly." In a footnote, the Court 
remarked that "It has generally been held that questions arising from 
notes given in conjunction with loans insured under the National 
Housing Act are to be determined by state law." 10 
§8.2. Testamentary trust of movables: Construction of "heirs at 
law." Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Weston1 represents an 
unexceptionable application by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court of the established conflicts rule that, absent manifestation of 
intention that another law shall control, the law of the testator's 
domicile supplies the rules of construction of a testamentary trust of 
movables, even though the foreign forum has chosen its own law as 
governing matters of trust administration, the fiduciaries being of 
the forum and it being otherwise clearly intended that the forum would 
be the locus of administration of the trust.2 
Here the testatrix, widow of an inhabitant of Massachusetts, died in 
1911 domiciled in Maryland. She was described in the will as of Balti-
more. The will was probated in Maryland, and ancillary administra-
8326 Mass. 367, 94 N.E.2d 771 (1950). 
1112 U.S.C. §§1702 et seq. (1946), as applicable at the time the case was decided. 
10326 Mass. 367, 370 n.l, 94 N.E.2d 771, 772 n.l (1950), citing United States v. 
Dobbins, 139 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1943); United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 
F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Hansett, 120 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1941). 
§8.2. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 883, 174 N.E.2d 763, also noted in its trust aspects in 
§2.8 supra. 
2 Cf. Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, §§295, 299, 308 (Tent. Draft No.5, 
April 24, 1959). Beale, Conflict of Laws §251.2 (1935), states: "As the rule is usually 
stated, without nice qualifications, the interpretation of a will is in accordance with 
the laws of the testator's domicil, even though the will was made elsewhere." Sec-
tion 308.1 states: "The courts, not distinguishing too meticulously between usage 
and law, lay down the rule that, nothing calling for a contrary view, language in 
the will is to be interpreted according to the domicil of the testator." 
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tion was obtained in Massachusetts. The residue of her estate went to 
a Massachusetts trustee, and the trust was for many years administered 
by Massachusetts trustees appointed by and subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Massachusetts Probate Court. After the termination of the trust 
in 1958 the petitioner, a Massachusetts corporate fiduciary, as sole 
remaining trustee petitioned for instructions with respect to disposition 
of the trust fund. At issue was the composition of the class of re-
maindermen denoted by the phrase "heirs at law." Under Massachu-
setts precedent heirs at law would in this context be construed to mean 
those who were heirs at law at the time of the testatrix' death in 1911. 
Under Maryland law, as subsequently determined by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, heirs at law would be determined as of the 
termination of the trust in 1958. 
The Probate Court decreed the heirs at law to be those at the death 
of the testatrix. On appeal prosecuted by persons qualifying as "heirs 
at law" at the termination of the trust, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed, deciding that Maryland law controlled and construing Mary-
land case law as requiring that the heirs at law be determined as of the 
date of termination of the trust. 
The following is a summary of cases cited by the Court as tending 
to support the choice of law rule applied in the Weston case. In 
McCurdy v. McCallum,s the testatrix being domiciled and her will 
proved in Nova Scotia, the construction, meaning, and legal effect of 
a clause of the will were determined under Nova Scotia laws. The 
trustees and executors were also Nova Scotians. The question was 
whether a "request" was mandatory or merely precatory or permissive, 
so that the legatee took $2000 absolutely rather than as a trustee. 
Brandeis v. Atkins4 arose out of an agreement of compromise be-
tween Massachusetts residents, approved by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in regard to property located in Massachusetts, creating a trust 
for a term of years, which provided that if the beneficiary died before 
the term ended (as in fact she did), the sum was to be paid to her heirs 
at law. The Court said "heirs at law" were to be determined by Mas-
sachusetts law and not by New York law, where the beneficiary died 
domiciled. The Court said that "ordinarily when a contract is made 
and to be performed in the same jurisdiction the law of the place 
governs the construction of its language and the rights of the parties 
under it." Obviously, this decision is at best peripheral to the issue 
presented by the Weston case. 
In Phelps v. Matoon,5 the question whether language created a testa-
mentary trust was determined by the law of Vermont, where the testa-
tor died domiciled. He "may freely be assumed to have relied upon 
the law of that state for the rules to be applied in the interpretation of 
his testamentary words." In that case the will was allowed in the pro-
bate court in Vermont. The estate contained real and personal prop-
3186 Mass. 464, 468,72 N.E. 75, 76 (1904). 
4204 Mass. 471, 474·476, 90 N.E. 861,862 (1910). 
5310 Mass. 97, 99-100, 37 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1941). 
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erty, some of the real property apparently being located in Illinois. 
In New England Trust Co. v. Wood,6 a will was drawn and executed 
in Turkey by a testator who had spent most of his life in Turkey but 
who died a Massachusetts domiciliary. The Court held Massachusetts 
law to be applicable in determining the class of appointees intended 
under the testamentary power of appointment to his "heir or heirs," 
conferred upon his wife. The validity of the exercise of this power by 
his wife was held to be determinable by Massachusetts law, since the 
testator died domiciled in Massachusetts and the testamentary trust of 
the property subject to the power had its situs in Massachusetts. How-
ever, as to his wife's will, executed in Greece by her, a citizen and resi-
dent of Greece, who died domiciled in Greece, it was noted that Greek 
law governed validity of execution and construction of the words 
"heirs" and "usufruct." 
6326 Mass. 239, 242-243, 93 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1950). 
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